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During the past decade the budgeting processes of the
Federal Government have been the subject of continual and
highly controversial discussion, with many ideas for improve-
ment advanced. Constantly recurring in these discussions is
the question of control of unexpended balonees, substantial
amounts of which are not even obligated.
Year after year, budget estimates have been presented
to the Congress by federal agencies. In many cases, Congress
has appropriated total funds for agency programs and has
exercised no further review or control over the timing or the
effectiveness of actual spending. One of the results has been
the carryover of unobligated funds. Some of these carryovers
remain available for years, through changes in administration
and in both domestic and world conditions.
It is the purpose of this paper to discuss the question
of unobligated carryover in defense, since such funds relate
primarily to the Department of Defense. Unobligated carryover
rather than unexpended carryover was chosen in order to delimit
the subject and because it posed more of a problem.
As research on unobligated carryover progressed, the
collateral problem of expenditure control became prominent.
I found these two concepts so interrelated that I wondered if
my subject had been wisely chosen. The two concepts are nearly
ii

inseparable, and they will so appear In this paper.
During the research period, interest was heightened by
House debate on legislation purporting to obviate the necessity
for carryover funds. This legislation concerns the accrued
expenditure basis for appropriations. There is a conflict of
opinion on the accrued expenditures concept between the House
and the t« which remains to be resolved. This pending
legislation is now on the Senate calendar for early action.
In addition to written information sources, this paper
is based upon assistance and interviews from various represen-
tatives in the Department of Defense, especially the Office of
the ftavy Comptroller. The wholehearted cooperation and assist-
ance of these representatives are gratefully acknowledged.
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IXirlng recent years, the unobligated carryover of
defense funds has been a matter of great concern to the military
departments, to Congress, and to others. Prior to fiscal year
1951 $ the Congress followed the practice of providing a
combination of cash appropriations and unfinanced contract
authority to meet contracting requirements in the no-year
appropriations. This procedure covered major procurement and
construction for the military services, ffect of this
practice was to keep unexpended balances and unobligated carry-
over at very lovr levels.
The practice of providing appropriations to fully author-
ize the approved military procurement and construction programs
was adonted in 1951 during consideration of the fiscal year
1952 budget. As a result, military appropriation requests now
cover the procurement of a specific number of ships, aircraft,
or other items, or a specific increment of military construction,
The effect of this practice is to show on the books substantial
unobligated carryovers.
Appropriation Committee actions on the requests of the
military departments are taken on the basis of programs pre-
sented for approval and programs approved. Funds necessary to

2oarry out the approved program are made available through the
appropriation procedure. Although a program has been approved
and financed for a given number of aircraft, for example, the
entire number may not be contracted for at the same time or
even during the same fiscal year. Further, many components of
all aircraft, especially shorter lead-time items are ordered
so that delivery will be phased in accordance with installation
requirements. The result is an unobligated balance in the
appropriation as of June 30 to be carried over into the next
fiscal year. Such is the nature of unobligated carryover.
Fully authorizing or fully financing the defense prog-
ram was a measure initiated by the Congress. According to the
Congressional view, the major drawback in contract authority
was that it was extremely difficult for the legislative branch
to exercise effective control over, and effective evaluation of,
the military programs. In addition, along with contractual
authority went the objeetional practice of one Congress
committing another future Congress, in effect, to grant appro-
priations in later years to continue or to complete programs.
I do not wish to imply that this was the total
congressional view. The Senate does not claim responsibility,
as is witnessed by this statement during the Defense Department
Appropriations Hearings before the Senate Appropriations Sub-
committee J
pnator Hayden. If* had no trouble about this at all
when we operated under contract authority. We gave you
so much money to be expended during the following fiscal
year, as much as you asked for.

Then you said, In order to carry on, we will have to
have authority to enter into contracts during that year,
but we won't need any cash.
As long as we operated that way, we did not have to
carry these huge sums of money. But the House of
presentatives changed it. They put this provision
in the law, that when an airplane is ordered or a ship
is ordered, we must appropriate the full amount for the
life of the ship, practically, that is what it amounts
to. That is, for the ship which is building over a
period of 2 or 3 years, and then the spare parts, and
all the other things. So it drags on. We appropriate
for the whole thine. They say you cannot enter into
any obligation unless you have that money already
appropriated.^
The policy of fully financing each program at the time
of approval by Congress creates certain advantages for the
military services. It permits the military departments to
plan and schedule procurement and delivery through contractual
commitments in a more efficient and economical manner. It
gives assurance to the military that it has at hand the
necessary financial resources, rather than having to make
commitments in the expectation of later appropriations under
the contract authorization concept. Further, it ensures the
military that when an end item is delivered it will be complete
in all respects, and not unusable because of a shortage of
components, the procurement of which is dependent upon later
appropriations. Finally, it releases the military from fiscal
pressure to Incur obligations within an arbitrary time span that
is incompatible with the continuing production and construction
programs
.
U. 8. Congress, House. Department of Defense Appro -
priations for 1956 . Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the
Committee on Appropriations. 84th Congress, First Session,
p. 778. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955.

4Because of these and other advantages which aocrue, the
military departments favor the full financing of programs
concept. y believe that the development of sound programs
and sound financial management requires that procurement,
construction and research programs be fully financed in terms
of obligational authority at the time the programs are approved
by the Congress, They believe further, that sufficient funds
should be earmarked for obligation beyond the budget year to
p
assure completion of the projects Justified to the Congress.
In testifying before the Senate Appropriations Sub-
committee Hearings concerning Department of Defense appropria-
tions for 19"
i
cretary /ilson stated that the Department of
Defense favored the full funding concept. Re said that he was
not enthusiastic about current year funding because people get
too enthusiastic about their new projects and they underestimate
how much they are going to cost. It is easier to start something
that is only soing to cost $100 million that it is something that
is going to cost $150 million. Once started, projects must be
finished, thus creating the possibility of not having funds for
the right projects at a later time.^
Notwithstanding the approval and support of the full
funding concept by the military, the end result of such concept,
g
Ibld ., p. 247.
3
U. S. Congress, Senate. Department of Defense Appro-
priations for 1958 . Hearings before the Subcommittee of the
Committee on Appropriations on H. R. 7665. 85th Congress,
First Session, p. 13. Washington: G-overnment Printing Office,
1957.

as earlier indicated, is the accumulation of large unobligated
balances at the end of the fiscal year. The unobligated
carryover in military appropriations from 1952-53 was #7.4
billion; from 1953-54, :'9. 4 billion; from 1954-55, $15.7 bil-
lion; from 1955-56, gll.5 billion; from 1956-57, $12.4 billion;
from 1957-58, £10.3 billion. The estimated unobligated balance
to be carried over for fiscal 1958 is ('8.1 billion. All of
these figures are high; for the years 1954 and 1955 they are
excessively high. The Defense Department thought they were too
high. In appearing before the Senate Subcommittee on Appropria-
tions in April 1955, Assistant Secretary wcNeil said, "First,
I want to repeat that the amount of unobligated carryover in
the last two years has been too high. It will be higher this
June 30 than it should be.
The excessively high unobligated carryover in fiscal
1954 and fiscal 1955 is explained by the actions taken on
cessation of hostilities in Korea. Congress provided substan-
tial funds in the fiscal 1954 budget to carry on the Korean
build-up. These funds were utilized for procurement of capital
equipment, for expansion, of the military forces, and at the
same time for carrying on the "war." The funds that were
provided by the Congress in August, 1953, financed procurement
of material at combat consumption rates into 1955. Budgets for
4
U. S. Congress, Senate. Department of Defense Appro-
priations for 1956 , Hearings before the Subcommittee of the
Committee on Appropriations on H. R. 6042. 34th Congress,
First Session, p. 253. Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1955.

6fi8oal 1951 and 1952 did not finance beyond the year of the
budget, but both the Congress and the administration decided
that for fiscal year 1954, enough money should be provided to
finance beyond the budget year in order to cover the procurement
lead times involved.
The amount of money appropriated was high, anticipating
high levels of procurement.
The cease-fire came in July, 1953. For a period of
about three months, not knowing whether hostilities would resume
or not, little change was made in procurement schedules. After
that, schedules were cut down so that production plants would
be kept running more slowly, but for a longer period. The
cutting back of schedules meant that the funds would not be
uped as originally planned. The funds became unobligated
carryover, and, of course, added substantially to the total
unobligated carryover for years 1954 and 1955.
Realizing that the unobligated balances were excessively
high, for fiscal 1954 and 1955, the Department of Defense made
plans to substantially reduce the carryover. A total of $15-7
billion in unobligated funds was carried over into fiscal 1955.
This amount was brought down to #11.5 billion carried over into
fiscal 1956. The attempt to reduce these balances was to
result in an unobligated carryover of '6.5 billion at the end
of fiscal 1956. A further gradual reduction was planned to
bring unobligated carryover down to a level "approaching the

level normally expected."^
In Implementation of the planned reduction of unoblig-
ated carryover, the unused funds were not used as originally
planned. For tv/o successive years, no additional procurement
money was requested for the Army. In other words, The Department
of Defense was using up funds carried over fro;n previous years.
The Army is not the only example. The point is that the
Department of Defense had a financial plan for reduction of the
substantial unobligated carryover— a plan which, when projected
to June 30, 1956, would reduce unobligated carryover to '6,5
billion. Hindsight indicates that the plan might have been a
little more stringent; that it might have been possible to work
off the excess funds a little more rapidly. But the plan was a
good one; funds were not used unless needed, a condition which
might not have pertained had a more rapid reduction program
been attempted.
In addition, the plan was successful in that planned
reductions vrere accomplished. However, the unobligated balances
were not reduced to the levels anticipated by the Department of
Defense. During the period of the planned reduction of un-
obligated balances, the military went through some fundamental
changes in their obligation practices. The changes arose from
implementing two key pieces of legislation. Each of these was
designed to substantially improve the fiscal management within
5
U. S. Congress, House. Department of Defense Appro-
priations for 1956 . Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the
Committee on Appropriations. 84th Congress, First Session, p.
559. v;ashington: Government Printing Office, 1955.

8the military departments, which purpose it has accomplished,
but the residual effect has been to require a higher level of
unobligated carryover from one fiscal year to the succeeding
year.
The first of these legislative enactments originated
as section 110 of the Mutual Security ; riation Act for
1955 and was continued as section 100 of the Mutual Security
Appropriation Act for 1956, Under this new legislation, procure-
ment of items common to a military service and to the military
assistTic^ program are purchased by that military cervices based
on the issuance of orders to the military services. Such orders
make provision for reserving funds in the military assistance
appropriation
,
providing obligational authority to the military
departments and delivery of the itews specified in the order to
the military assistance progra* The military departments are
reimbursed in their appropriations for material delivered or
services performed*
Previously, the military departments had to attempt to
account separately In their supply programs for their own and
military assistance items which were identical. Such attempts
were unworkable from a practical point of view, since there was
no accurate way of determining in advance whether the military
department or the military assistance program would get delivery
of any particular item.
The change provided much needed authority for the inte-
gration of procurement for the military assistance program
with procurement for the military services. The result was

procurement and supply-management economies. It cleared up
the former complex and uncoordinated system of financing
military assistance program procurement. However, the anti-
cipated reimbursements from outstanding ilitary assistance
fund reservations, for which reimbursements will not be received
until after the end of the fiscal year, are carried forward as
unobligated carryover. It is In thi ner that the imple-
mentation of section 110 of the Mutual Security Appropriations
Act of 1955 adds to the amount of unobligated carryover.
The second of these legislative enactments, and by far
the more important, is section 1311 of t ontal Appro-
priation Act of 1955. This legislation constituted the first
comprehensive statutory definition of fundi recordable as obli-
gations against funds appropriated by the Congress.
Prior to section 1311 » it was the practice within the
Department of Defense to record obligations at the time the
Government was thought to have- Incurred a liability. This was
done even though all details of the transaction had not been
worked out. Under the broad criteria established in section
1311, and in the regulations issued by the Department of Defense
to implement this section, an obligation can be recorded only
when there Is a completely binding agreement, fully executed,
to meet the needs for the fiscal year.
In addition, recorded obligations are now required to
be fully supported by contractual documents and other records,
at appropriate organizational levels, and such records are to




The implementation of section 1311 within the Defense
Department was difficult. The thangei were of great magnitude.
Certain points required clarification by the Comptroller
• problem was further eeaplieated by thp fact that
le£l ion was not approved until August 26, 195^. Specific
regulation? within the Intense establishrr.ent were not able to
be issued until April 28, 1956. Thi? caused unavoidable delays
in filing reports required by section 1311 for June 30, 1954
and June 3'\ 1955.
In the initial implementation of section 1311, there
obligations which did not meet the criteria for obligatie
were reclassified as unobligated— "unobligated •" The natural
effect was to inci unobligated balances to be carried
forward. Another o.ie of its effects, possibly more far-reach-
ing, is that it has lengthened the tine period between initia-
tion of a transaction and the tine at which such transaction
can be recorded as a firm obligation. Since there will always
be certain transactions underway at the end of any particular
fiscal year, this lengthened ti riod will have the effect
of increasing the level of "planned unobligated carryover."
The concept of a "planned unoblig carryover" was
initiated by Assistant Secretary of Defense MeNeil during the
hearings on Department of Defense Appropriations for 1956.
If we are to maintain orderly procurement processes
near the end of a current fiscal year and in the early
months of a succeeding year, it is essential to provide
a "planned unobligated carryover." For example, we
should have funds reserved and available for the
engineering changes necessary to complete items already
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on order and in production. Similarly, funds must
be available to cover the total cost of long lead-
time items, orders for which may be placed in a
series of phased steps over a period of time. As an
illustration, in ship construction long-lead items
such as hull and machinery may be obligated before
June 30 in a current year with shorter lead time
components placed under contract and obligated in
the succeeding year. This applies also to other
complex long-lead time items such as aircraft.
°
£ till another effect of Section 1311 was the establish-
ment, within the Department of Defense, of the Comprehensive
Commitment Accounting System. This system is unique among
Government Agencies, and provides for accounting for procurement
actions prior to obligation, as well as accounting for progress
in performance. It allows determination of the day-to-day
status of long lead-time programs.
The precise amount the planned unobligated carryover
should be for any particular year is not capable of determina-
tion. It would depend on many factors such as the level of
appropriations and the level of activity within programs.
However, the precise amount is not too important. What is
important is that the amounts of the unobligated balances should
be reduced by the amounts not genuinely needed to carry out the
authorized programs in future years. Funds no longer needed to
complete prior year programs should be applied, with Congression-
al approval, as a credit against the next year's funding
U. S, Congress, Senate. Department of Defense Appro-
priations for 1956 . Hearings before the Subcommittee of the
Committee on Appropriations on H. R. 6042. 84th Congress,




requirements. With such a procedure, unobligated carryover
should approach the level that normally would be expected to
be available from year to year. And this is the procedure




Any attempt to Justify the necessity of carrying
forward unobligated balances in the Department of Defense
should emphasize that such Justification concerns minimum
amounts. As pointed out in Chapter One, the cease-fire in
Korea resulted in excessive unobligated carryover, loreover,
the implementation of section 1311 of Public Law 663, 84th
Congress, prevented reductions at the rate planned by the
Department of Defense. Nevertheless, the policy of the Depart-
ment of Defense has been to reduce the amount of unobligated
funds which are not genuinely needed to carry out the program
in future years. Whenever and wherever funds have been found
no longer needed to complete prior year programs, they have
been applied as a credit against the next year's funding
requirements, with Congressional approval.
What are these minimum amounts that are capable of
Justification? As stated earlier, the exact amount is not too
important if the budgetary procedures and practices are designed
to keep the unobligated carryover at a minimum. However, some
guide lines have been Indicated. During the Department of
Defense Appropriations Hearings for 1956, Assistant Secretary




carryover, "at the present time, the aggregate of about $8
billion ir: nbout the right level," His estimate was based on
the volume of business that would be ] or under nego-
tiation as of the end of th< fiscal year and an amount specifi-
cally set aside for shorter l*au-tiice iters and other require-
ments. Is OS billion minimum is the amount that must be
justified,
A distinction must be made between fully funding of
the military programs and fully obligating the funds received.
The fiscal control gained by fully financing the planned
procurement, construction and research programs would be lost
if the military department?: tried to obligate all available
funds at quickly as possible. Actual obligations oust be
carefully timed to assure that maximum return is received for
each dollar obligated. This procedure is dictated by a sound
program and sound financial management. Thus, contracts for
short lead-tiro components of a major procurement item, such
as a ship, are placed at a later time than contracts for longer
lead-time components. would be wasteful to do otherwise.
To order the anchors, chain, fire-control equipment, and all
other short lead-time items at the time the Keel was laid v/ould
be unsound. Such procurement practice would result in some
short lead-time items being unusable due to ship alterations
U. S. Congress, Senate. Department of Defense Appro-
priations for 1958 . Hearings before the Subcommittee of the
Committee on Appropriations on K. R. 7665. 85th Congress,
First Session, p. 460. Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1957.

during construction, or obsolete because of improvements in
the short lead-time components. Quite the opposite procedure
is ne: et of the Installed s^siip»ent ilj nould
be ordered as late a.? possible, long after contracte have been
awarded for hull and aehinerj«
Thus, eound program and financial management dictate
that certain funds b-= committed for obli;^-tion beyond the
budget yesr to assure completion of the programs justified to
the Congresi . Those certain funds—unobligated carryover.
Unobligated carryover is inherent in the full funding
of programs. It is required to carry out the intent of the
Congress with regard to the manner in which military programs
are to be financed and managed.
The Congress recognized the need for orderly planning
and contracting; and the elimination of year-end pressure to
obligate expiring funds by the establishment of the "rio-yeax*"
appropriation principle. Congressional sotion on successive
military budget requests has been consistent with this principle
since 1952. The House Appropriations Committee in its report
number 216, dated March 21, 1957 stated as follows:
.vera! billions of dollars could be out from nev;
appropriations requested for 1958 for such long lead-
time items as ships, aircraft, missiles, and so forth,
because the budget contemplates that not all of the
new funds requested will be contracted and obligated in
1958. This situation arises from the generally prevailing
practice of providing funds at the outset for the totsl
estimated cost of a given item so that the Congress can
clearly see and have complete knowledge of, the full
dimensions and cost when it is first oreeented for
appropriations. An alternative would be to appropriate
in the first year only the amount estimate 1 to be obli-
gated in that year, leaving to later years installment
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appropriations to complete the necessary funding.
But this sort of partial funding tends to be less
than fully informative and in effect somewhat mis-
leading. An instance arose on one of the appropriation
bills last year wherein an amendment in the order of
million was adopted with ease to being a project
the ultimate cost of which will be in excess of #1
billion. Had the initial appropriation been a billion
dollars instead of a million dollars, the outcome may
well have been different.
2
It is believed that the basic Justification for unobli-
gated carryover lies in the fact that military budget estimates
are submitted to Congress in a manner consistent with the above
principle. In other words, budget estimates are submitted in
accordance with the full funding concept, a concept in which
unobligated carryover is Inherent.
In addition, there are many requirements, some of them
peculiar to the Department of Defense, which lend support to
the basic Justification. One such requirement concerns sub-
secuent engineering changes. From long experience, the military
departments know that nearly every major item of military
equipment requires engineering changes after it has been placed
in production. These changes are required as a result of
improvements developed in the course of production, technologi-
cal advances, or deficiencies which develop during initial
tests. ound programing requires recognition of the fact that
such changes involve costs, that these costs are a part of the
total cost of the item, and to provide in advance the funds
required to meet them. For example, in carrier construction,




the technological advance of the canted flight deck. Once
this innovation had been proved successful and a desirable
change, it would be wasteful to complete carriers then under
construction with conventional flight decks, only to be altered
at a later date. To provide for such contingencies, subsequent
inhering change funds are included in the total program costs,
but they are carried as unobligated until the necessity for
obligation arises.
Another such requirement is first destination transpor-
tation. Funds must be reserved to cover first destination
transportation of long lead-time items which will be delivered
in a subsequent fiscal year. This permits the contracting
officer to specify whatever method of delivery is most advan-
tageous to the government. There was a time when materials
were purchased and the price did not include the transportation
to the first warehouse where it entered into inventory. A
government bill of lading was used, and first destination
transportation was charged to a separate appropriation account
for transportation. Then it did not show as a cost of the item.
Ordinarily, the contractor can deliver it cheaper than it can
be delivered by government bill of lading. It saves money to
so finance the whole procurement at the time and use the most
economical and best method of transportation. But first
destination transportation funds are not obligated until time
of delivery— thusu/vobligated.
Still another requirement is spares for initial equip-
ment. When an item of procurement is budgeted, the budget
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amounts include an amount for Initial spares. In aircraft
procurement, for example, this amount is equivalent to about
30 per cent of the basic cost of the aircraft. A few spares
might be definitized and ordered in the first year of produc-
tion. As an rircraft becomes operational, and some spare parts
usage data is gained, an accurate forecast of the rate of
wearing out can be made; then the spare parts are definitized.
A greater part of these spares would be definitized over a
period of two or three years. As these spares were firmed up,
they would then be recorded as an obligation. In the meantime,
it would be shown as unobligated carryover until the spares
requirements lists were completed. The funds are set aside,
but they cannot be obligated until requirements are known,
ices are determined, and delivery dates firm.
In the case of ships, after delivery has been made by
the contractor, certain equipment must be installed at naval
shipyards before a ship Joins the fleet. Such equipment is
usually electronic and of a classified nature. The funds
reserved for installation costs of these items are not obligated
until after delivery of the ship. But they are budgeted for in
the initial estimates, and are held committed but unobligated
until the ship nears completion. This work after delivery
constitutes another requirement for unobligated carryover in
the military.
In contracting for procurement, construction, and
research of the size and nature carried on by the Department of
Defense, it may be proper to carry forward unobligated balances.
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fufficient should be on hand at the end of a fiscal year to
carry forward the program on an ev^n keel through the opening
months of a succeeding fiscal year. In many cases production
may commence on the basis of a letter order, and only the
amount of the letter order can properly be obligated. Consider-
able time may elapse before a mutually satisfactory definitive
contract can be made and remaining funds obligated. Where
this process overlaps the closing months of one fiscal year and
the early part of the next, adequate funds must be committed to
cover the full cost of contracts.
Finally, unobligated carryover is a recognition of the
fact that it is not possible to obligate exactly 100 per cent
of a program in any one fiscal year. It represents an effort
to reflect the highest degree of realism so that Congress will
have a better knowledge of the financial operations of the
military.
In addition to the above factors for which unobligated
carryover should be earmarked, many things may occur during
the budget year that may affect programs. It is possible that
price reductions, economies, and other factors may free funds
not required for currently authorized programs. Then the
budget estimate of unobligated carryover would be increased by





The department of Defense has been criticized by the
Congress and others not only for the high levels of unobligated
carryover; they have been criticized for even having such a
thing as unobligated carryover. The record of Hearings of the
Appropriations Subcommittee each year since 1952 is filled with
page after page of criticism. Some of this criticism is Justi-
fied; some of it is not. Some criticism results from a misunder-
standing of the problems of procurement, construction and
research; some of it results from an honest attempt to foster
economy and efficiency in the military departments; at least
a portion of the criticism appears to be an attempt to spread
on the record the "economy-raindedness" of certain of our
legislators. For whatever the reasons, the Congress has been
extremely critical of unobligated carryover in defense.
The major criticism of unobligated carryover in defense
funds is that the Congress has lost control of the purse strings.
The carryover of unobligated balances, critics argue, means
that expenditures in any one year may be made from new obliga-
tional authority, obligated carryover, or unobligated carryover.
This system results in an inconstant and fluctuating relation-




each year and the volume of federal government expenditures for
that year. The new obligational authority may exceed or fall
short of the obligations incurred by the military departments
in that year, since obligations may be incurred against
unobligated carryover. In addition, expenditures depend on
the r hich goods and services are delivered. Critics
point out that the system makes it impossible to control annual
expenditures
.
In his book ''Economy in the National Government" Senator
Cou^las, talking about his service on the appropriations
:>ittee, was led to conclude:
We are rapidly getting into a situation where Congress
no longer has complete control over the expenditures of
funds for defense purposes* If the Oopartment of Defense
is able to get enormous sums which are then not spent,
and if these unspent funds accumulate from year to year,
then the control of Congress over the level of actual
military outlays in any given year will be continually
diminished. Each Congress will be faced with growing
amounts of expenditures fixed by previous appropriation.
The criticism that Congress has lost control of the
purse strings leads naturally to the criticism that Congress
cannot determine whether or not the budget is balanced. It
makes sense that if expenditures can not, in fact, be determined,
Congress has no way of telling whether there will be a surplus
or a deficit.
Another major criticism is that substantial unobligated
George B. Galloway, The Legislative Process in




car r indicates a less than adequate fi olicy. Critics
claim that funds should not be requested unless they car.
defended. They do not want the military to ask for funds that
will not be obligated and therefore wou 9% have actually
been required for a whole fiscal year. As an example of this
critic 1
.
witness this exchange durin earings on
Department of Defense Appropriations for 1956.
. r. ;-:ahon. I have worked with military appropriations,
r. Secretary, since 1940. The Armed forces did a poor
Job of budgeting during World War II. It was difficult
to do a good Job. I thought a poor Job was done in bud-
geting probably during the Korean war and I agree that
this may have been unavoidable, but I will tell you
frankly I have been shocked and disturbed now that we
are at peace that the Deoartment of Defense is doing
what appears to me to be such a poor Job in making
these estimates.
It seems to me that the conclusion could well be
reached that the Department of Defense, despite all the
talent at the top, is running a rather loose operation.
Now, I listened very carefully to your testimony about
unexpended funds and unobligated funds. It seems to me
no« that we are leveling off and now that we are not
aiming at any particular target date, and now that we
are not in a shooting war, and now that we are working
on the budget for the third fiscal year, you would not
estimate that there would be so many billions of dollars
unobligated—and I say unobligated--at the end of the
fiscal year 1956.
:ow, that to me is Just about Inexcusable, and I
would like to have the best statement the lentagon and
you can provide in explanation of this thing.
I think the average businessman and the average
mto«r of th - iUb where Congr m would make
a speech, or the directors of the Chamber of Commerce
would have a tendency to say, "Why is Congress so
foolish as to permit continuation of such loose fiscal
policy with such vast sums of money that are unobligated?"
It is easy to explain that you do not spend it all
because you have the long lead-time items, but if you
ask for money that you will not obligate in a year to
the tune of £5 billion or |6 billion, it Just does not
seem to make sense at this particular time.
•retary Wilson. I am sorry that you do not think
are doing any better, because we really are.
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. Mahon. You are doirr ar, but It does not
seem to me we are doing sufficiently better. have
had a crash am, but we have b?en out of the crash
prOfTram for months and months, and that is the thing
that I cannot quite fathom.
People sometimes have a tendency to point out to
the ^ss, and particularly to tV of this
subcommittee, and say, 'You boys let those military
people pet by with s.y do you not get a better
operation? Why do you have all those loose billions at
the end of the fiscal year that have not even been obli-
gated?
I know a lot about this subject, if I may say so,
but frankly, I could not make a sufficient good
defense of your present position. 2
Another criticism is that having large unobligated
ryover leads to overexpenditure. Critice claim that it is
only human nature to overexpend if the funds are available. The
argument goes like this: If you give a person *100, he will
make th lO« If you give him *200 he will spend that for the
same ae. The critics say further that if there is not in
fact overexpenditure, at least there exists the opportunity to
overexpend. There should not be unobligated funds on the books
to err hie opportunity; such funds should revert to •
Treasury.
ill another criticism of the unobligated carryover is
that it if9 unnecessary. The question posed is why not reduce
new military obligational authority to the extent of the
v
,ed balances? In other words, if one of the military
services needs *10 billion and has at the same time unobligated
carryover of $2 billion, why not request *8 billion. Why ask
3
priatlons for 1956 . Hearing*
Commitiee on Appropriations
.
129-30. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955.
\, congress, House, apartment of Dyfenje Appro-
?
is ,. s Before the uboommittee of the
. 84th congress, First Session,
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for money that is not going to be obligated? Critics ar«ue
that Congress is in sees ion throughout the year and could grant
funds to the military service in need of them. Their conten-
tion is that if you c ^tici^ate an unobligated carryover a
year in advance, current reauests for funds should be reduced
by that amount.
Critics further claim that unobligated carryover leads
to expenditures for r?urooses other than those authorized by
the Congress. After cessation of hostilities in Korea, the
had huge unobligated balances. These were due largely to
a cut-back in production schedules. :.s &. result the Army re-
ceived no new obligational authority for two successive years.
They were criticized on the grounds that they diverted the
money appropriated for things other than whet they asked for.
nator Ellender. Well, start to do it n.0 1 « Instead
of making these transfers why do you not come with direct
appropriations and let the rest go to the Treasury? That
is the procedure I think you ought to follow. Why do you
not say, ''Gentlemen, we have not spent the money appro-
priated last year, let it go back to the Treasury and when
we need it appropriate it.
I think that is the better procedure than to shift
it from one to the other.
3
Another criticism of unobligated carryover in the
military is that it lends itself to waste and overbuying.
The excessive amount of money in the hands of the Army, Mavy
and Air Force, 1' ads sharp vendors to selling them a bill of
ade, ruch criticism is usually accompanied by the classic
3
U. S. Congress, Senate. Department of Defense ppro -
priations for 19*56 . Hearings before the Subcommittee of the
Committee on Appropriations on H. R, 6042. 84th Congress,
First StBsion, r>* 365. Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1955.

example of the l.'r.vy having on hand enough canned hamburgers to
last 60 years. The critics believe that if we could keep our
Lures in thr al year, overbuying snd waste
could not result,
-nally, the degree of accuracy of lone-range planning
in the military is questioned. A military department presents
its Justification for fund requests to the Congress. Under the
policy of full disclosure, the unobligated carryover is pre-
sented as a portion of the budget finite monetary terras,
i question invariably arises how the military department can
ascertai efinite amount a year in advance and where it
will be used if it is used at all.
•oubtedly there are Itlonal Congressional criticisms
of the unobligated carryover in the Department of Defense. I
have " those which I considered a©ft important. I do
not wish to leave the impression that Congress alone has been
critical of unobligated carryover. The problem has concerned
numerous persons and groups, in and out of Congress.
In 1957, Poland Hughes, the Budget Director, engaged a
group of outstanding financial experts to study the question
of t! carryovers and expenditure control, and to submit
recom:' 'ions. This group recommended the annual accrued
expenditure basis of stating proposed appropriations with
contracting authority, as needed, for contracts and orders to
be placed for long lead-time items, The findings and recom-




Probably the most critical, and certainly the most
important analysis was made by the Second Hoover Commission.
The commission felt that to restore Congressional "control of
the purse," it was necessary to change from an obligational
basis to an accrued expenditure basis for appropriations. Their
reasoning was that by appropriating in terms of obligational
authority, Congress grants an amount of money which might be
nt over a period of several years. In those cases where
Congress appropriates funds for long-range programs and the
money is not entirely obligated or expended in one year, there
results carryovers of large unexpended or unobligated amounts.
Af the Commission stated in Its report;
There is no limitation as between years on the
amounts to be obligated except to the extent that
they are apportioned to the agencies by the Bureau
of the Budget. Neither is there an effective post-
review of such appropriations by either the Bureau
of the Budget or the Congress. The procedure has
been to review in minute detail the new program for
the budget year under consideration with little
consideration of past performance. This inadequacy
applies particularly to military procurement.
In considering the application of an accrued expendi-
tures budget, the Commission divided the Government * 8 activities
into two categories: Long lead-time programs for the procure-
ment of aircraft, ships and weapons, research, and construction;
other programs in which obligations coincide mainly with the
accrued expenditures for each year. In the first category,
Budget and Ac,counting. A Report to the Congress by
the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the




long lead-time nrograms, the agency would submit initially a
program showing the full funding reauirements. Congress, in
their approval, would appropriate funds in terms of the
estimated accrued expenditure?: required for the year in ques-
tion. Congress would also grant contract authority beyond the
year under consideration. The program would be reviewed annually
by the Congress and the agency to determine oropress. Where
necessary, Congress would be required to appropriate funds to
meet contractual obligations and to restate the amount of con-
tracting authority remaining within the program.
In the second category where lead time is not important,
the Commission considered it desirable to budget on the basis
of accrued expenditures also. Although these would involve
administrative areas only, the extension of accrued expenditure
budgeting to these areas was favored from the standpoint of
uniformity In budget procedures.
At the same time as the Hoover Commission was conducting
its work, the Secretary of Defense established the Advisory
Committee on fiscal organization and procedures for the purpose
of reviewing the accounting and financial methods of the
Department of Defense. The committee was composed of leaders
in industry and government and was chaired by Charles P. Cooper,
President, Presbyterian Hospital, New York, after whom the
committee took its name.
The objective of the Cooper Committee was "to develop
recommendations for an effective, simplified and standardized
fiscal and reporting system, as well as an improved organization
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for all financial matters, In the entire Department of
'>; >ir-> The Hoover Commission task force maintained clo
liaison with the chairman and his staff. In its report, the
oper Committee came up with numerous recommendations which
the members felt would accomplish the objective stated above.
The budgeting portion of this report contained the following
statement in connection with its budgeting sals
:
Iowever, in order to gain the maximum benefits
from budgeting and account!^ a cost basis, the
Committee suggests that consideration be given to a
basis of appropriating that would be more closely
related to coots in the sense of goods and services
received than the basis now used* Although some
provision for congressional authorization to contract
ifor long lead time C. 0* D. orders would be needed,
the cost approach would focus attention on the resources
to be received and those to be used in the budget year."
These studies are cited to indicate that concern ov
the problem of carryover and the collateral problem of controll-
ing the rate of annual expenditures is widespread and is not
limited to Congress, or even to the Legislative Branch. The
conclusions and recommendations of each of these studies,
however critical, show an honest attempt to come to rips with
a problem that has been of concern to so many in recent years.
Financial Management in the Department of Defense .
A Report to the Secretary of Defense by the Advisory Committee
on Fiscal Organization and Procedures, October 1954.
Appendix A, p. 73. aohington.




Criticism by the CongresB and other groups of
unobligated carryover in Defence has led to wide acceptance of
the nroposal by the Second Hoover Commission to eliminate it.
The Commission has proposed a major modification in appropria-
tion practices which would do just that. If their proposals
were followed, agency budgets would be presented in terms of
annual accrued expenditures, defined as the charges incurred
for goods and services received. 1 All appropriations would be
annual. Procurement of long lead-time items would be reviewed
annually by the Congress under the contract authorization
concept. The practice of carrying forward to the next fiscal
year unobligated balances would cease.
Although this Hoover Commission proposal was the basis
for recent legislation relating to budgeting and accounting,
the idea was not new or unique. Early in the 1950 f s bills were
introduced by Representative Coudert to establish Congressional
control over government expenditures each year in relation to
Budget and Accounting . A Report to the Congress by
the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the





revenues for the year. viodically, con men cine; In 19^7*
Senator Byrd has introduced le<~ ion seeking improved
control over the annual expenditures of government. Senator
cClrllan has periodically introduce J islation for a Joint
congressional committee on the budget. ".'here have undoubtedly
been other legislative efforts to combat the increasing loss of
control by the Congress of its constitutional power over the
Federal purse. The effort which has received the most public-
ity and general public interest, hovrever, has been the legis-
lation relating to the Hoover Commission proposal that appro-
priations be stated in terras of annual accrued expenditures.
The commission recognized that, transitional nroblems
would be encountered in the installation of the proposal . One
necessary adjunct would be for Congress to cancel unexpended
and unobligated carryover and to substitute annual appropria-
tions to liquidate accrued expenditures. Another would be to
authorize- supplemental contract authority. The Commission
added that, "the adoption of this proposal will require adminis-
trative changes in the Government's budgeting and accounting
procedures, particularly in the Department of Defense, and will
require education of those concerned with the budgetary process
and the working out of the precise mechanics.""
Legislation to implement the Hoover Commission budget
and accounting recommendations, including the annual accrued




1956 as B. T199. Hearings on this bill by a subcommittee of
the Fenate Committee on provernment ilons indie that
revision might be desirable to eliminate recommendations
that could be implemented by administrative action and to
confine the legislation to matters which recuire legislative
it or legislative revision:?.
At the direction of the fthairman ( c>n<3tor John Kennedy),
represr-ntPiive.B of the General Accounting Office, the Depart-
ment of the Treasury, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Staff
of the Committee redrafted the bill. The redraft vae intro-
duced as 3« 3897 on Kay 21, 1956, by Senator Kennedy, with
ator T:»yne and 30 other senators as co-sponsors. This bill,
which became known as the Kennedy Bill was considered in open
hearings during June 1956. Following the hearings, the bill
was approved by the subcommittee and the full Senate Committee
on Government Operations and was unanimously passed by the
Senate* One of the features of 6, ?897 was the inclusion of
annual accrued expenditure basis of stating proposed
appropriations with resulting elimination of carryover.
During the same period, a Subcommittee of the House
Committee on Government Operations was considering H. R. 9^02,
which was similar to the Payne Bill introduced in the Senate,
and to other bills introduced to carry out the Hoover Commission
budget and accounting recommendations. As the House hearings
^U, C. T'OTigress, Senete. Improving Governmental
Budgeting, and Accounting, iacthods and Procedures . Senate Report
< 2265, 84th Congress, 2d Session, p. 3. " V/ashington:





continued, consideration was also given to H. R, 11526, intro-
duced "by Representative Paul G. Rogers, which was comparable
to B« 3897* The House Government Operations Committee reported
out H. R. 11526 without the annual accrued expenditure appro-
priation rrovisions and it was so voted by the House. The
House version was accepted in the conference of the two legis-
lative bodies and this bill was signed by the President as
Public Law 863, 84th Congress, on August 1, 1956.
This law call? for accrual accounting, cost-based bud-
geting, simplification of allotments, and other improvements
in the methods to be used in the financial management practices
throughout Government. It did not, however, include the annual
accrued expenditure basis of stating appropriations. During
consideration of the bill by Congress, this provision was
deleted. In explanation, the committee on Government Operations
included the following statement in House Report ho, 273* J
The bill as originally introduced contained a
provision instituting the submission of budgetary
requests for appropriations on an annual accrued
expenditure basis. The committee heard strong
testimony from the chairman of the Committee on
Appropriations of the '.cuse and the ranking minority
member of that committee objecting to the accrued
expenditure device primarily on the ground that it
vrould necessarily lead to contract authority for
programs which extend beyond 1 fiscal year. It was
felt that contract authority weakened Congressional
control, and it would not realize the benefits claimed.
On the basis of these objections and the committee's
o<n study, the provision for appropriations on an
annual accrued expenditure basis was deleted from
the bill.
6
^U. 5« Congress, House. Improving Governmental Budget-
ing and Accounting Methods and Procedures . House Report No.
273* • oAth Congress, 2d Session, p. 13. Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1956.
6Ibid
. , p. 4.
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In January, 1957, ftt the start of the first session
of the 85th Congress, companion bills were introduced in the
Senate and House covering the annual accrued expenditure recom-
mendation. Hearings were held on these bills before the Senate
and House ."overnment Operations Committees at which both
proponents and opponents were heard. Both committees favorably
reported the bills and, on June 7, 1957, MM ate unanimously
approved S. 434. The bill reported by the '-louse Committee on
3-overnment Operations, H. H. 8002, did not come to a House
vote during the first cesr-ion of the 85th Congress,
The purpose of these bills vas to provide more infor-
mative basis for the enactment of appropriations by the Congress,
to reduce or eliminate the large carryover balances of appro-
priations from one fiscal year to another, and to bring about
economy in government expenditures.
These companion bills gave the President authority to
convert appropriation estimates, with the exception of those
appropriations exempted, to an annual accrued expenditure basis,
where he deems appropriate In the interests of better financial
management and better control of expenditures, It was fully
recognized that if appropriations for long lead-time Items are
stated on an annual accrued expenditure basis, it would be
necessary for the Congress to provide contract authority.
S. 434 and H. R. 8002 were designed to provide that authority.
H. R< 8002 had a terminal date of July 1, 1961, but S« 4-34 did
not.
Proponents of both bills included the President, the
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•retary of the Treasury, the Director of the Bureau of the
Iget, end the Comptroller Gtonerel. Former President Herbert
vpt and many public figures, acting through the Citizens
7Committee for the Hoover Report, ftlSC favored the bills.
Opponents included most of the House Appropriations Committee
and somr ents of industry, particularly those defense-
oriented. The Department of Defense took the position that
the present system of appropriating and obligational authority
was in the best interests of the taxpayer. They recognized that
the accrued expenditure budget did have merit, but believed
unobligated carryover was mandatory in loner term procurement.
The Department of Defense was far more concerned about implemen-
tation than the basic Congressional policy Indicated in the
bills. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
represented the Department in hearings on both these bills and
stated
:
We would like to state that we believe that the
present basic system of appropriating and obligational
authority, and we grant that improvement might be made,
is in the best interests of the taxpayer, whether or
not accrual expenditures are recorded and utilized as
part of the budget process. If the Congress chooses,
however, to provide obligational authority In similar
manner, it would not, in our opinion, be in the best
interests of the Government to do so by providing part
so-called cash expropriations and part contract authority.
Congress chooses, however, to provide obliga-
tional authority on a contract authority basis and
appropriate on an annual expenditure basis— the cash
expenditure basis or accrued expenditure basis is not
important--there is a suggestion we might make which
would involve consideration of the overall cost of
each program presented and at the same time involve
7U . S . Congre s s , S eBate . Hearings Before a Subcommittee
of the Committee on Government Operations on S. ^I6~and S. 4^A.




full consideration and review of expenditures. It
is simnly to provide oblirational authority in full
amount, and I wr.nt to repeat, not part cash and part
contract authority, for programs authorized by the
Co a— I plead that we never get into that
again—on a no-year basis for orocurement, construction,
and research in our case, In .or somewhat similar
to the present act, but in a part II of the act to
provide, after examination and review of programs,
the aggregate amount approved for expenditure for
t for th<^ fiscal year, either on a cash^
expenditure basis or on an accrued expenditure basis.
H. R. 8002 was debated in the House on March 5 and 6,
1958. During the debate, the proponents of the bill presented
se views:
9
The present method, which permits large carryover
balances of appropriated funds, vests in the agencies the
authority to decide the extent to which funds will be expended
each year. The proposed method vests the prime responsibility
for determining the level of agency operations each year in the
Congress.
The budget surplus or deficit, which is an Important
barometer of the Government's current financial position, is
determined on an arnual basis. But, the important element of
expenditures which enters into this annual computation is not
subject to adequate Congressional control other than in terms
of debt limit. The proposed method would provide for annual
appropriation action by Congress which would bear a close
relationship to the level of expenditures entering into the
annual budget surplus or deficit.
8Ibid., p. 43.
QFor convolete debate see U. S. Congressional Record ,
March 5 and 6, 1958.
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The proposed method of annual accrued expenditure
appropriations would reaulre positive Congressional considera-
tion, each year, to costs and accomplishments and to future
costs and olanned accomplishments under authorized programs.
By this means, unsatisfactory performance, inadequate planning,
current cost estimates will be mor r directly considered
in annual appropriation actions so that more prompt remedial
action can be taken, if necessary.
The requirement of annual review of program accomplish-
ments 3Dste, both past and future, will place needed
emphasis on program performance. This is especially true when
such review takes place with annual Congressional appropriation
action in relation to planned operations for the ensuing year.
Increased economy and efficiency in government operations would
result by actions of both the Executive Branch and the Legis-
lative Branch.
The opponents countered with these arguments:
'?ropriatlon on the accrued expenditure basis is the
same as installment buying and will add to the cost of Govern-
ment, Programs and projects will be started and continued
because of the relatively small amount of the annual appro-
priations, which would not be started initially If the Congress
was required to appropriate for the full cost of the entire
pTOgy— at the beginning.
Stating appropriations on the I accrued expenditure
basis requires a companion grant of authority to the agencies
to enter into contracts and orders in advance of appropriations

37
of funds. Past experience ^ith contracting authority was not
satisfactory, because, once contracting authority is granted,
the subsequent aooropriation of funds is mandatory and
automatic.
The administrative procedures and paper work require-
ments in the Department of ^efense are cumbersome. It would be
froic three to nine months after an annual accrued expenditure
appropriation was enacted before a contractor's bills for work
performed during the year covered by the appropriation could
be paid. Any delay in payment of proper bills would seriously
disrupt defense-oriented industry, and substantial delays could
result 1b work stoppages and possible permanent financial
injury to such industry.
ither contractors nor the Department of Defense can.
project precisely the amount of accrued expenditures that will
be incurred during a budget year.
The appropriations committees, under the present system,
do make an annual review and evaluation of program accomplish-
ments and plans.
Too much has been claimed for the bill as a means of
great savings. H. R. 8002 was held out to the nation as a
proposal which would save '4 billion a year. But there is no
easy way to save money; the only way to reduce expenditures is
to reduce appropriations and reduce authorizations for appro-
priations.
Additional legislation is not required in order to have
agency appropriations requests submitted on an annual accrued

expenditure basis. The President, if he so elects, can do
thi3 un listing i tion.
Opponents objected primarily to the "contract authority"
feature- ihc bill. They tried to kill the bill by moving
to strike out the enacting clause, by nOTlng to rocomn.it the
bill, and by offering amendments to the bill. During the debate,
ivSglesv.orth of Massachusetts, a strong proponent of the
bill, offered an amendment to the bill. Hla amendment proposed
to delete the controversial contract authority concept from the
bill, and in his Own words
I
Dp, igglesworth, hi In an, as I stt-
yesterday, I offer this substitute amendment in the
spirit of compromise, in the belief that every Member
of the House today desires to obtain the best possible
control over the obligations of this Government and the
best possible control over the expenditures of this
-wornnent.
y amendment is designed to do three things:
first place it eliminates completely from
the picture the proposal in H. R, 8002, that as far
as obligations are concerned, we go back to the practice
of contract authority which we abandoned some years
ago as unsatisfactory.
In the second place, it accepts the balance of
proposal putting the Congress in a position, if
it so desires, to place an annual limitation on expen-
ditures in terms of accrued expenditure.
In the third place, it incorporates language to
carry into effect the- proposal Just made by the
distinguished gentleman from Mew York (lO% Taber),
which in effect waives points of order against
rescissions, transfers, or reappropriatlons. I
believe all of us feel that this is a very desirable
thing. 10
H. R, 8002, as amended, was adopted by the House on
March 6, 1958 by a vote of 311 to 87. It is presently on the
Senste calendar for action.
10
• Congressional Record
. Vol. 104, No. 16,




All of the preceding parts of this paper have dealt
with a seeming flaw in the budgetary process. In recent years,
the military departments have presented estimates to the
Congress for carrying out their programs. Included in these
estimates have been unobligated carryovers, the need for which
the agencies have attempted to Justify. The main criticism
of these balances is that the powers of Congress, in the direc-
tion and control of expenditures, have been impaired. To remedy
this situation, the proposal of making appropriations in terms
of annual accrued expenditures has been advanced, To effectuate
this change, Congress would give to the agencies contracting
authority in terms of the dollar amount required for orderly
forward contracting beyond the budget yeer>
The purpose of this concluding chapter will be to dis-
cuss whether or not Congress has actually loot control of the
purse, whether or not annual accrued expenditure budgets would
cure the defects complained of, and offer some predictions about
what the future holds for the question of unobligated carryover.
The answer to the question of whether or not Congress
has lost the power of the purse depends primarily on how the




and sole control of the r»urse strings. In the field of budget
authorizations, nearly all budget authorizations are available
for expenditure beyond the fiscal year; the availability
periods vary. This is especially true in military appropria-
tions because of the relatively long lead-time involved in
their procurement programs. At the beginning of a fiscal year,
there may be unobligated or unexpended balances in the appro-
priations. : llovay says "in actual practice Congress exercises
varying degrees of control over each of the component elements
of this concept: Revenues, legislative authorizations, appro-
priations, obligations, expenditures, unexpended balances,
borrowing, and fiscal policy." For the purposes of this paper,
by control of the purse strings referring to carryover funds,
we must conclude that Congress has lost control.
The next point for consideration is whether or not the
accrued expenditure basis of appropriations would restore to
the Congress the control of expenditures which it has lost.
Under the accrued expenditures basis for appropriations, the
new concept of forward contracting authority vrould apply, to
not only those programs requiring long lead-time, but also to
regular annual operating expenses. Applying the annual accrued
expenditure basis to this latter category of programs was a
proposal of the Second Hoover Commission in the interest of
uniformity. In reality, this would not constitute a change
from the present system for current expenses. Po the problem
"Galloway, op. cit .. p. 136.
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becomes one of defense procurement appropriations requiring
long lead-time and the question: .111 the change from
obligational authority to contractual authority restore to
Congress the control of the purse
V
The current practice is to appropriate funds for a
definite program. With the appropriation goes full funding
authority to carry out the program—authority to make contracts
and authority to pay bills when presented. Contract authority
must include all of the elements now included in an appropria-
tion, except the final step of authorizing payment of bills,
if it is to be effective. If Congress should fail to appro-
priate funds to pay for contracts entered into pursuant to the
contract authority concept, the only possible result would be
deficiency requests, or, finally, court .Judgments. Under
contract authority, Congress would lose control at the time the
contract authority was issued. Contract authorizations are
merely in effect promises to pay. Contracts made under such
authority are legally enforceable, and Congress must, in subse-
quent years, appropriate whatever funds are required to cover
them. Congress has no discretion, once the contract authoriza-
tion has been granted.
It is argued that the accrued expenditures concept
allows Congress to review each year the long-term projects which
are now subject to little if any scrutiny once the funds have
been voted. While the concept does require a second look by
the Congress, along with this second look goes the action to
provide money for contract authorizations previously issued.
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We rauFt conclude that contract authority does not restore to
the CongreBB the control of the purse.
In this connection, without failing to recognize the
contributions of the fecond Hoover Commission in the budgeting
and accounting fields, perhaps their report could be criticized
on at least two counts of interest in this paper. The first
of these was in estimating the annual savings that would result
from implementation of their recommendations; the second is
"lr recommendation of the contract authorization concept
hout an explanation of how contract authorization offers
any better control over the final expenditure than the present
method of appropriation. The drain on the Treasury would be
the same under contract authority as under the present system.
As to the future of unobligated carryover, I will
venture to say that the eroblem will be with us for some time.
Granted that it is desirable to keep future commitments at a
minimum, and that so far as practicable the annual nature of
the budget should be maintained. But the annual budget is
really not annual, not even in its most simple parts. A budget
item providing for salaries in a particular bureau, for example,
must be related to the number that are expected to be on the
roll at the beginning and end of the year. A proposed increase
or decrease in force cannot be effected at the beginning of a
fiscal year, and the appropriation must take this into account.
To make a truly annual budget, the Government would have to
close Its offices and activities on June 30 ~nd reopen on
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2July 1 on a completely new basis.
oreover, prudence and necessity often dictate that
long-range commitnents be made. In making these long-range
commitments, it is necessary to reserve funds to pay for them.
It is not too important that these funds remain unobligated
for a time. It is not even too important to the military whether
the authorization is in the form of appropriation or contract
authority. ..hat is important is that the authority or the
funds are available when needed— that they do not lapse at the
end of the fiscal year.
I do not believe the legislation relating to accrued
expenditures now oendinff will be enacted into law. The Presi-
dent has, on at least four separate occasions, asked for this
©uthority which Congress has seen fit to deny.-5 Congress broke
away from contract authorizations in 1951 » and it is doubtful
that they will return to it. They simply do not like the idea
of committing the federal budget to substantial expenditures
several years ahead. The Congress has had ample opportunity--
in Public Law 798, in Public Law 863, to return to contract
authorization. They presently have the opportunity in 5. 434
and H. R. 8002. However, before H. R. 8002 was voted by the
2George Y. Harvey, "Contract Authorization in Federnl
Budget Procedure . " Public Administration Review , Volume XVII,
o. 2, Spring 1957.
ij
U. E. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government
Operations. Providing for Improved Methods of Stating Budget
Estimate s. Senate Report 2io. 39%~* 55th Congress, First
Session, p, 1. "Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957.
\ duse Report Ko. 1797, to accompany Tax Bill K. R.
7768, The General Appropriation Bill.

House, the objectionable contract authorization principle
was deleted.
I believe that control of expenditures by the Congress
will be improved within existing appropriations practices.
The unobligated balances exist in Just a few items involving
only a few appropriations. Each of them is being isolated and
studied by the military departments . Already they have done
much to minimize these balances* The House Appropriations
Committee has also studied these balances and through its own
efforts have made many improvements. The basic problem that is
being attacked is the reason for each balance. The difficulty
lies in lack of coordination between program planning and
budgeting. Eut this coordination is Improving with each
budget.
The important point, in my opinion, is that in the area
of unobligated carryover in appropriations, the Department of
Defense is getting better. It is getting better through
improvement in accounting and budgeting practices, with a
view to furnishing the Congress with more reliable information
on which to base its decisions and minimize unobligated carry-
over to whatever extent may be possible. This Improvement is
result of orderly, constant attention to details. This
roach is slow, tedious, and wholly undramatic, but it is
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